Ramai
yang tertanya-tanya apakah maksud perbicaraan mengikut Aturan 14A yang akan
dilalui bagi kes tuntutan Royalti Kelantan.
Aturan
14A ini telah diperkenalkan melalui pindaan yang dibuat ke atas Kaedah-Kaedah
Mahkamah Tinggi 1980 pada tahun 2000 melalui pindaan PU (A) 342/2000. Tujuan
kewujudan Aturan 14A ini adalah jelas iaitu untuk mempercepatkan proses
pelupusan kes (pada peringkat Interlokutori lagi) demi untuk menjimatkan masa
dan kos Mahkamah.
Ini
jelas dinyatakan oleh Yang Arif Hakim Mohd Noor Ahmad di dalam Penghakiman
beliau semasa memutuskan kes Petroleum Nasional Bhd v Kerajaan Negeri
Terengganu [2004] 1 MLJ 8 di Mahkamah Rayuan. Di dalam kes
tersebut, beliau menyatakan dengan jelas bahawa:
"
[10] We have to consider the scope and efficacy of O 14A. The order was
introduced into the RHC by PU(A) 342/2000. Its purpose is to expedite the
disposal of an action at interlocutory stage in order to save costs and time.
It was adopted from the English equivalent with some modifications. Our O 14A
reads:
(1)
The court may upon the application of a party or of its own motion determine
any question of law or construction of any document arising in any cause or
matter at any stage of the proceedings where it appears to the court that —
(a)
Such question is suitable for determination without the full trial of the
action; and
(b)
Such determination will finally determine the entire cause or matter or any
claim or issue therein.
(2)
Upon such determination the court may dismiss the cause or matter or make such
order or judgment as it thinks just.
(3)
The court shall not determine any question under this order unless the parties
have had an opportunity of being heard on the question.
(4)
The jurisdiction of the court under this order may be exercised by a registrar.
(5)
Nothing in this order shall limit the powers of the court under O 18 r19, or
any other provision of these rules."
Diputuskan
di dalam kes Bato Bagi & ors v Government State of Sarawak [2008]
5 MLJ 587 bahawa:
"[7]
The scope of this rule under the English Supreme Court Rules (O 14A) which is
in pari materia with our own O 14A was discussed and expounded by the English
Court of Appeal in the leading case of Korso Finance Establishment Anstalt v
John Wedge [Unreported, February 15,1994, CA Transcript No 94/387]. The
principles enunciated in that case on the application and scope of the rule was
approved and followed by our own Court of Appeal in Petroleum Nasional
Bhd v Kerajaan Negeri Terengganu [2004] 1 MLJ 8. In the Petroleum
Nasional Bhd's case, the Court of Appeal also referred to a number of Singapore
cases which also applied the principles on O 14A as enunciated in the Korso
Finance's case, and said that it was inclined to follow those decisions in its
interpretation of the scope of O 14A of the RHC. If I understand the Petroleum
Nasional Bhd's case, correctly, the Court of Appeal held that when faced with
an application under O 14A, the court must decide what is the threshold issues
in the case that require determination; and if the threshold issues are capable
of being determined under the rule its determination would be and should be
decisive of the whole litigation or essentially the main part of the suit. That
it said would result in a substantial saving of time and costs as it would
significantly cut down the costs and time involved in pre-trial preparation or
in connection with the trial proper. It was held in that case that 'even if the
case appeared to or was complicated, it did not mean that the court must shun
away from considering the applicability of O 14A and O 33 r 2 of the RHC in
relation to the questions of law which were clear and definite'. However at
this juncture is worthwhile to bear in mind the words of caution by Sir Thomas
Bingham MR in E (a Minor) v Dorset CC [1995] 2 AC 633 HL, which were quoted in
The Supreme Court Practice (1997), Vol 1, Part 1, London, Sweet & Maxwell
at p 185 as follows:
But
applications of this kind are fought on ground of a Plaintiff's choosing, since
he may be generally assumed to plead his best case ... [If] the legal viability
of a cause of action is unclear (perhaps because the law is in a transition),
or in any way sensitive to the facts, an order to strike out should not be
made. But if, after argument, the court can be properly persuaded that no
matter what (within the reasonable bounds of the pleading) the actual facts
[are] the claim is bound to fail for want of a cause of action, I see no reason
why the parties should be required to prolong the proceedings before that
decision is reached."
Berdasarkan
kepada Aturan 14A tersebut, ianya jelas menunjukkan bahawa Penggunaan 14A
tersebut adalah bertujuan untuk penyelesaian penuh bagi sesuatu kes tersebut
jika kes tersebut dapat diselesaikan dan diputuskan hanya berdasarkan kepada
intepretasi sesuatu undang-undang atau kontruksi sesuatu dokumen yang tidak
memerlukan kepada bukti-bukti lain (extrinsic evidences) dan juga bukti secara
lisan (oral evidence). Ini bermaksud secara ringkasnya ialah, tiada saksi akan
dipanggil untuk memberikan keterangan lisan bagi tujuan perbicaraan kes
tersebut. semuanya akan diputuskan berdasarkan dokumen yang ada dihadapan
Mahkamah sahaja.
Namun
begitu, sebelum Mahkamah menggunapakai Aturan 14A tersebut untuk tujuan
Pelupusan sesuatu kes, terdapat garis panduan yang perlu diikuti yang mana
garis panduan tersebut telah diputuskan oleh kes-kes duluan (precedent).
Antara
asas penting yang menjadi syarat utama sebelum Mahkamah boleh mengguna pakai
Aturan 14A di dalam menyelesaikan sesuatu kes ialah kedua-dua pihak tidak
mempunyai sebarang pertikaian berhubung fakta kes, atau di mana mahkamah,
setelah meneliti pliding, memutuskan bahawa fakta-fakta penting tidak
dipertikaikan.
Makanya,
suatu Permohonan di bawah A 14A ini adalah untuk memutuskan peruntukan
undang-undang yang jelas atau interpretasi kepada sesebuah konstruksi dokumen
yang tiada pertikaian lain selain kandungan dokumen tersebut.
Prinsip
undang-undang ini jelas dinyatakan di dalam Yang Arif Hakim Ramli Ali (JCA)
semasa memutuskan kes Low Chee & Sons Sdn Bhd & Anor v Extreme
System Sdn Bhd and another appeal [2013] 1 MLJ 650 di Mahkamah
Rayuan:
"
[15] We are in agreement with learned counsel for the respondent, that based on
the facts and circumstances of the present case O 14A application is not\
suitable on the following grounds:
(a)
For an O 14A to be invoked, all material facts relating to the subject matter
in the claim must be undisputed or admitted. The court should not give a ruling
under O 14A in vacuo or based on hypothetical facts which can only be
determined at full trial. The crux of the plaintiff ’s claim is that the
defendants acted in concert to take over Ho Hup in breach of theTake-Over Code
and the Securities Commission Act. These factual allegations in the amended
statement of claim are vehemently denied by the defendants. Order 14A procedure
cannot be invoked on the basis of assumed facts (as what has been done by the
learned judicial commissioner). The O 14A procedure is not appropriate where
there are conflicting allegations of fact (see: Cycle Links Co Ltd v Chevalier
Construction (Hong Kong) Ltd [2007] HKCU 400; Petroleum Nasional Bhd v Kerajaan
Negeri Terengganu [2004] 1 MLJ 8; Seloga Jaya Sdn Bhd v UEM Gynisys Sdn Bhd
[2007] 7 MLJ 385 and William Singam a/l Raja Singam (suing as the Public
Officer of Pertubuhan Kristian Thareethin Kudaram, Ipoh Perak) v Meeriam
Rosaline a/p Edward Paul & Ors [2009] 7 MLJ 888);
(b)
The above authorities clearly indicate that there was no question of ‘assuming
all the facts were true for the purpose of an O14A application’. The learned
judicial commissioner should not have made a determination under O 14A based on
assumed or hypothetical facts;
(c)
the O 14A procedure in the present case does not dispose of a substantial part
of the action and therefore there will not be any saving in costs and time. The
learned judicial commissioner in his grounds of judgment accepted this principle.
There will be no such saving as the same evidence will be led with respect to
the remaining causes of action; and
(d)
the O14A application is to determine whether a breach of the Take-Over Code and
the Securities Commission Act will give rise to an actionable breach of
statutory duty for damages; but the relief sought in the plaintiff ’s claims
includes a mandatory order to compel the defendants to make a mandatory general
offer and for damages for failing to make the general offer. The other causes
of action are the claims for collateral purposes and for conspiracy. Both these
claims are still good and would entail leading at trial, the same evidence
showing the breaches of the Code and the Act, even if the determination of the
O 14A is in favour of the respondent."
Prinsip
Undang-undang ini turut dinyatakan dengan jelas oleh Yang Amat Arif Hakim
Zulkefli Ahmad Makinuddin (sekarang merupakan Hakim Besar Malaya) sewaktu
memutuskan kes Dream Property Sdn Bhd v Atlas Housing Sdn Bhd [2008] 2
MLJ 812 di Mahkamah Rayuan pada waktu itu. Beliau menyatakan
bahawa:
"
[6] I am also of the view that O 14A of the RHC is not a vehicle for which the
court is required to interpret the statement of claim to decide what point of
law arises before deciding on it. An application under O 14A of the RHC is to
decide clear points of law or construction that are apparent on the pleadings.
It is to be noted in this case the learned judicial commissioner proceeded to
hear the plaintiff ’s O 14A application without the benefit of the defendant’s
defence which had yet to be filed at that time of the hearing of the
application. Instead, the learned judicial commissioner thought it fit to
choose to only confine himself to the averments made by the plaintiff in its
statement of claim. The learned judicial commissioner has failed to
sufficiently identify the relevant issues arising from the action, which
necessarily ought to include the defendant’s defence to the action. Therefore,
the learned judicial commissioner was not in any position to make the said
order that he did, ie, that the plaintiff ’s action against the defendant was
suitable for determination under O 14A of the RHC. On this point I would like
to refer to the case of Watson & Anor v Dutton Forshaw Motor Group Ltd
& Ors EWCA, 22 July1998 wherein the Court of Appeal therein stated, inter
alia, as follows:
With
the benefit of hindsight it is possible to see that this is where things began
to go wrong. In fact the particulars would not be relevant to the O 14A
application either so far as the plaintiffs were concerned or so far as the
defendants were concerned. The issue of law, if it was discernible at all, had
to be discernible from the statement of claim and the defence. The judge
himself ruled at the outset of the hearing of the O 14A application on 17
October 1994 that he should not adjourn that hearing as he was requested to do
by the plaintiffs’ counsel on the basis that particulars were about to be
delivered ‘since it is not the function of particulars to take the place of
necessary averments in the pleading’.
[7]
It is trite law that, for the court to exercise its power to summarily dispose
off an action under O 14A of the RHC, there should not be any dispute by the
parties as to the relevant facts, or that the court, upon scrutinising the
pleadings, concludes that the material facts are not in dispute. (see the case
of Petroleum Nasional Bhd v Kerajaan Negeri Terengganu)."
Prinsip
undang-undang ini juga turut diterangkan secara panjang lebar oleh Yang Arif
Hakim Azahar Mohd sewaktu memutuskan kes BP Malaysia Sdn Bhd v Zabedah
bte Mohamed & Ors [2007] 8 MLJ 384 yang beliau menyatakan
bahawa:
"
[11] It may be added that in an application under O 14A, the question of law or
construction should be in clear and precise terms. All parties concerned must
make every effort to come to an agreement on all the necessary and material
facts relevant to the question of law or construction of documents that the
court is required to determine. In an application under O 14A there is no room
for any dispute between the parties as to the requisite material facts. The
important point to note here is that in the present case all the necessary and
material facts relating to the subject matter of the question had not been duly
proved or admitted by the parties concerned."
Secara
peribadi saya tidaklah berpendapat bahawa kes tuntutan royalti Kelantan boleh
diputuskan melalui cara ini kerana terdapat saksi-saksi yang boleh didengar
oleh mahkamah untuk menentukan niat pihak-pihak ketika perjanjian tersebut
ditandatangani. Apatah lagi individu-individu berkenaan masih hidup hingga ke
hari ini kecuali Al-Marhum MB Kelantan semasa itu yang telah meninggal dunia.
Akan
tetapi Mahkamah telahpun membuat keputusannya dan wajarlah pihak-pihak
menghormati pendirian mahkamah tersebut dan meneruskan perjuangan tuntutan
royalti ini mengikut saluran perundangan yang masih ada.
Hisham
bin Fauzi
Pengerusi
Pertubuhan
Pengamal Undang-undang & Hak Asasi Manusia Malaysia Cawangan Negeri
Kelantan
(PROGUAM
Kelantan)
